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ABSTRACT 
This thesis applies a systems engineering approach to determine significant ground 
system design factors that impact the mission objectives of an urban area defense 
operation. The shift in conventional warfare to urban operations changes the determinants 
of an operationally-effective ground system design. Urban terrain characteristics pose 
different battlefield conditions and design challenges to ground system in an area defense 
operation. Limited by engineering constraints, ground systems should be designed to 
leverage the operational environment to achieve mission success. 
Drawing reference to performed functions in urban area defense, this thesis 
identifies four design factors of passive and active survivability measures, mobility, and 
sensor classification range. Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA) software is 
used to model an area defense operation against an invading enemy. This thesis utilizes 
nearly orthogonal Latin hypercubes (NOLH) to determine the design points for 
simulation. For each identified measure of effectiveness (MOE) of mission success rate, 
friendly attrition, and loss exchange ratio (LER) during an area defense mission, the 
effect of respective design factors and its relative contribution are analyzed. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
The prevalence of urban operations in current-day warfare poses different design 
challenges to ground systems design due to changing battlefield conditions and urban 
terrain construct. The aim of the thesis is to determine significant design factors of 
ground systems that impact an urban area defense operation through the application of a 
systems engineering approach to derive insights that facilitate decision making during 
design trade off analysis. 
Through clear problem definition and stakeholder analysis, three measures of 
effectiveness (MOEs)—mission success, blue force (friendly) attrition, and loss exchange 
ratio (LER)—are derived with close alignment to the effective needs of area defense 
operation stakeholders. The study of critical functions during area defense execution 
through functional analysis arrives at four categorized design factors for study. Passive 
armor thickness, ground system speed, and sensor classification range apply across all 
three ground systems’ type of M1 Abrams main battle tank (MBT), Bradley armored 
fighting vehicle (AFV) and Stryker infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), and the equipping of 
active protection systems (APS). M1 Abrams tanks are tested on their effects on the 
overall ability to meet the operational objectives. The selected design factors closely 
mirrored major area defense functions and critical aspects of ground systems design. 
Urban terrain characteristics are built into the model to develop a representative 
operational scenario in Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA) software. Using 
nearly orthogonal Latin hypercubes (NOLH), the approach allows for a manageable 
amount of 3,250 simulation runs with an acceptable correlation factor. 
Two significant factors stand out in influencing the three MOEs in an area 
defense operation. Passive armor thickness and the equipping of APS on the M1 Abrams 
tanks immensely increase the survivability of the platforms. The resulting enhancement 
in survivability lays the foundation for the achievement of the mission objectives in an 
area defense operation. With passive armor as the most significant factor in influencing 
the objectives of an area defense operation, it is thus imperative for continued 
development of better and lighter armor technologies to achieve the desired survivability 
 xv 
at reduced engineering requirements. The thesis also determines that not only does the 
equipping of APS have a complementary effect on the overall survivability of ground 
systems, but the APS is a viable substitute for passive armor to improve survivability and 
enhances mission success. On the other hand, improvements to mobility and sensor 
classification range have negligible effects of the area defense to achieve mission 
success, reduce friendly attrition, or improve loss exchange ratio. These insights enable 
informed design decisions during trade-off analysis with respect to the overall 
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If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.  
 
–Sun Tzu, Art of War 
 
To achieve mission success, survivability remains a key criterion of mission 
completion. Factors that improve survivability will translate to improvement in the 
probability of mission’s success, and it is imperative to design these considerations into 
the vehicle platform.  
Understanding the enemy and threats, the battleground conditions, and your own 
force capability, provide key information that determines the achievement of mission 
success. Conventional battles were previously fought in wide-open areas. As such 
engagements have been characterized by frontal attacks armored platforms are designed 
with heavy protection on the vehicle front with compromises made to other areas around 
the vehicle (Figure 1). Traditional up-armoring is the fundamental approach for 
vulnerability reduction to improve survivability. 
 
 Histogram of Relative Distribution of Incoming Fire in Conventional Figure 1. 
Mechanized Combat, Compared with Irregular Warfare (from 
Kempinski and Murphy 2012). 
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With the shift to an urban warfare environment, some mission success and 
survivability determinants have changed. For instance, the nature of combat in urban 
terrain means that attacks can come from all directions, including above or below. Heavy 
frontal armor may no longer suffice to reduce vulnerability. Traditional up-armoring of 
vehicles to ensure all-around survivability pushes platform design beyond the physical 
engineering limit. Current vehicles simply cannot carry the extra weight of continued 
passive armor upgrade to withstand the ever-increasing threat. 
To be sure, distinct characteristics of urbanized terrain offer good potential 
defensive positions for armored vehicles. Familiarity and structure of the urban terrain 
can also serve as the foundation to perform successful counterattacks. Terrain 
advantages, however, do not fully alleviate the pressing survivability design issue of 
insufficient payload for up-armoring protection. Systems have to be feasible within 
engineering limits, and the complexity of developing survivability solutions within the 
constraints of the physical system remains omnipresent. The defender needs to 
investigate the new success and survivability determinants in an urban battleground and 
employ more efficient survivability solutions during platform design to maximize these 
objectives. Enhanced survivability can be achieved during platform design through 
susceptibility and vulnerability reduction. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The thesis addresses the following research questions: 
1. What are the relative contributions to survivability of vulnerability 
reduction (armor and active protection) in defensive missions in an urban 
environment?  
2. What are the relative contributions of other survivability improvement 
approaches (sensors and mobility)?  
3. What are the primary design factors for consideration during ground 
system protection design for mission success and survivability in 
defensive mission execution in an urban environment?  
4. How do emerging technologies affect the survivability of ground systems 
during defense operations? 
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The analysis considers the importance of up-armoring with the objectives of 
better mission success and force exchange ratio, as well as lower attrition when 
performing an area defense in an urban setting. The thesis also looks at how the 
introduction of an active protection system affects the defense’s ability to achieve these 
objectives. Further analysis reviews how susceptibility reduction measures, in the form of 
increased sensing capability and mobility, will influence the outcome of a defensive 
operation. Understanding the relationships between susceptibility and vulnerability 
reduction techniques facilitates identification of important considerations to optimize 
platform design with a view of the current market technologies and future trends for 
defense operations. 
B. SCOPE 
The scope of the thesis builds around the scenario of an area defense operation in 
an urban environment. Through exposing the area defense to invading adversaries of a 
higher force ratio, the effectiveness of existing land platforms in the U.S. Army to 
achieve the desired objectives in an area defense mission are analyzed. Through variation 
of susceptibility reduction and the introduction of vulnerability reduction methodologies, 
the thesis aims to understand how these variables affect the achievement of mission 
objectives. The thesis also looks at how specific design parameters can improve mission 
success and match implementation in relation to the analysis results.  
C. APPROACH 
A systems engineering approach is employed to model the area defense operation. 
Vitech Core software is used to identify the main architectural considerations for a 
successful area defense. Through development of a system functional hierarchy, 
susceptibility and vulnerability functions that affect the overall survivability are 
examined. Using Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA) simulation software, 
these parameters are translated to model inputs for simulation. Generated results are 
analyzed with JMP statistical analysis software with the goal of understanding how these 
parameters impact the identified measures of effectiveness (MOEs) during the execution 
of an area defense in an urban terrain. 
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D. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis is organized into the following sections: 
1. Discussion of defense operation types 
2. Discussion of land platform design in vulnerability and susceptibility 
reduction 
3. Application of a systems engineering process model for an area defense 
operation 
4. Definition measure of effectiveness (MOEs) for an area defense operation 
5. Translation of system functions and MOEs into simulation model 
parameters 
6. Design of an experiment through the use of nearly orthogonal Latin 
hypercube (NOLH) methodology 
7. Simulation using MANA-V software 
8. Analysis of results to identify relationships and effects of vulnerability and 
susceptibility reduction on area defense operation success 
E. CONCURRENT STUDIES 
The spectrum of urban operations includes offensive, defensive, stability, and 
civil support operations (Department of the Army 2006). This thesis focuses on how 
passive armor capabilities, active protection system, mobility, and sensor classification 
capabilities of ground systems affect defensive operations. There are concurrently two 
other studies that focus on the effects of sensor attributes on movement operations, as 
well as the effects of armor attributes on offensive operations. The three theses provide 
an overview on significant design considerations that would impact the execution of a 
land operation. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. URBAN OPERATIONS 
The world is facing massive urbanization as rural and developing countries 
globalize. As urbanization changes the geographic landscape, battlefield conditions also 
change. With a shift in the warfare environment, operations in urbanized terrain are 
becoming prevalent. Recent wars of the United States in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) were fought in fairly urbanized terrain, unlike 
the conventional jungle and open terrain encountered in such conflicts as World War II. 
The nature of urban operations specified in Army’s Field Manual for Urban Operations 
(Department of the Army 2006) highlights a wide spectrum of urban operations: 
offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support (Figure 2). These operations are not 
mutually exclusive and can be performed concurrently. The focus in urban combat 
operations is on how physical aspects in the area of operations influence the effects of 
weapons, equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures on mission success. 
 
 Urban Operations Spectrum (from Department of the Army 2006). Figure 2. 
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B. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 
There are many reasons behind the conduct of a defensive operation: defeating a 
threat attack, buying time, shaping conditions to perform an offensive attack and 
protecting an urban population. The field manual for offensive and defense operations 
(Department of the Army 2013) highlighted three main types of urban defense 
operations: 1) area defense, 2) mobile defense, and 3) retrograde operations. The main 
difference between an area and mobile defense is that area defense concentrates on 
denying threat forces access into a specified terrain and places less focus on destroying 
the enemy, while mobile defense focuses on defeating the adversaries with a task force to 
perform the decisive extermination. Retrograde operation requires organized movement 
away from the enemy, leveraging complex terrain to break contact successfully with the 
threat. Area defense partially establishes the foundation for the subsequent performance 
of the other two defense operations. Holding an initial defensive position with an area 
defense as a fixing force sets the stage for a counterattacking mobile defense or an 
organized retrograde operation. 
C. URBAN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The urban operational framework developed by the United States Army and set 
out in the Urban Operations field manual underlines operation execution throughout the 
entire spectrum and is comprised of five main components: understand, shape, engage, 
consolidate, and transition (Department of the Army 2006). In joint urban operations, 
army land forces are a major component during execution. The framework provides an 
implementation concept of army combat power and capabilities and is applicable to the 
conduct of an area defense and aiding commanders in visualizing urban operations. It 
enhances commanders’ efficiency in mission execution by depicting the key tactical 
considerations during urban operations. 
1. Understand 
Continual assessment and maintenance of situational awareness of both the terrain 
and the enemy forces are fundamental to the successful conduct of any military operation. 
Every battleground condition offers tactical advantages and limitations to urban 
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operations. The presence of tall infrastructure allows minimum preparations by the 
defense to gain advantage of the good defensive and elevated positions over advancing 
threats. An urban terrain also reduces the defense frontage by between two to five times 
relative to a conventional battleground (Department of the Army 2013). The mass of 
man-made infrastructure interrupts line-of-sight and creates corridors of visibility only 
along axes, exposing the opportunities of canalized ambush. The urban environment 
limits the offensive power projection during an attack. 
Highlighted in the Urban Operations Manual (Department of the Army 2006), the 
clutter of physical structures also defuses electronic signatures and diminishes 
electromagnetic radiation, further limiting efficient communication among combatants 
during battle. A well-established communication network, however, will help the 
defense’s ability to achieve a significant tactical upper hand through the ability to 
perform coordinated and communicated operations amongst ground units. The key to a 
successful area defense operation lies in the understanding of terrain characteristics, 
leveraging these tactical advantages while overcoming the imposed constraints. With 
ample preparation, these advantages can be multiplied to become defensive strongholds. 
2. Shape 
The shaping of forces involves adaptation of tactical deployment to the physical 
environment in order to protect the force against advancing attack. The defensive shape 
sets the conditions for mission success at the tactical level. The commanders must 
understand how the urban environment impacts the ability to shape the defense. A 
layered defense strategy can be used to reduce the probability of rear exposure to an 
advancing enemy.  
A well-organized counter mobility strategy can effectively control the enemy’s 
direction and route of attack. Through the careful use of depth, breadth, and height for 
deployment, the defense can decentralize enemy maneuver, while simultaneously 
bringing to bear precision fire and coordinated operations to reduce the effectiveness of 
the invading forces. 
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3. Engage 
The engagement component denies the adversary control of vital functions, key 
installations, and geographical superiority in the urban area. The obstructed line-of-sight 
makes it difficult to acquire and engage targets at long range. Distances in urban 
operations are compressed and maximum engagement ranges greatly reduced. Offense 
and defense often engage at close ranges with limited maneuvering space for evasion. 
The urban terrain favors the defense—the offense is often limited to frontal attack tactics 
while the defense can inflict high casualties on the attacker from all sides and from 
elevated positions. 
4. Consolidate 
Consolidation of forces allows for the retention of the combat initiative. The 
consolidation of forces also facilitates rapid reorganization and repositioning of forces to 
initiate the next critical operation. In area defense, force aggregation is often utilized to 
create a fixed defense to prevent any threat occupation of a key terrain. 
5. Transition 
Transition signifies the movement from one phase of an operation to another, and 
is sometimes represented by a change of the execution authority from one unit or 
organization to another. Due to the nature of compressed distance, time, and battle 
intensity, transitions in urban operations occur with greater frequency and are of shorter 
duration. Transition is particularly important for an area defense operation. The area 
defense sets the platform to transit to a mobile defense counterattack to annihilate the 
enemy, or a retrograde operation to successfully pull out from the area of operations. As 
the battle concludes, transitions also occur as offensive or defensive operations transit 
into stability operations. 
D. IRON TRIANGLE OF VEHICLE PLATFORM DESIGN TRADE-OFF 
Military vehicle designs are principally based around the iron triangle of lethality, 
protection, and mobility. As much as a vehicle platform should be designed to be 
adaptable to changing battlefield requirements, combat system developers cannot 
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accurately predict the development trend of future threats. The three design aspects are 
interrelated and changes in one aspect will have an effect, usually degrading, on the other 
aspects. Governed by operational needs, the dominant consideration varies contextually 
with the operational environment.  
E. LETHALITY 
During engagement, one deciding factor of the ability to incapacitate the enemy is 
the extent to which the projectile overmatches the defense aid suite of the target to cause 
perforation and damage. The fundamental concept behind penetrator design is the 
optimization of energy concentration during impact to maximize the amount of inflicted 
damage. There are generally two types of direct threat: kinetic energy (KE) threats and 
chemical energy (CE) threats. Though the feasibility of directed energy (DE) 
technologies like high powered microwave (HPM) and high energy laser (HEL) for 
military applications are heavily studied and may be a potential threat in the near future, 
the scope of the thesis is focused on KE and CE threats.    
1. Kinetic Energy Threat 
A kinetic energy penetrator utilizes optimized flight dynamics to achieve high 
velocity, relying on the high kinetic energy possessed to penetrate armor. As a function of 
mass and velocity, kinetic energy threats can travel at speeds of up to 1500 m/s, making 
them very hard to intercept while possessing large penetrative power. The KE threats are 
usually fired directly from bore barrels or mounted turrets. Through concentration of high 
energy on a small impact point, KE penetrators are able to penetrate thick armor, 
resulting in fragments inside the vehicle. KE threats range from 120 mm rounds fired by 
tanks to smaller caliber projectiles fired from small arms. Generally, the higher the 
projectile caliber, the higher the amount of kinetic energy possessed and the larger is the 
penetrative power.  
2. Chemical Energy Threat 
A chemical energy threat, commonly known as a shaped charge, revolves around 
the concept of the Munroe Effect (Poole 2005). The design of shaped charges generally 
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consists of a metal material liner that is backed into the explosive within the charge 
(Figure 3).  
When the explosive detonates, the explosion creates a shock wave that collapses 
the metal material liner to form a hypervelocity metal jet up to 10 kilometers per second 
(Kempinski and Murphy 2012). When the jet impacts the target armor, it produces 
extreme pressure at the point of contact. This impact creates stress that greatly exceeds 
the armor’s yield strength, causing both the penetrator jet and armor to exhibit fluid-like 
behavior. This phenomenon of hydrodynamic penetration results in the radial expansion 
of the target armor material around the path of the metal jet, creating a hole while the jet 
penetrates through the armor. 
 
 A Sequence of Events in Shaped-charge Jet Formation (from Poole Figure 3. 
2005). 
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F. PROTECTION AND SURVIVABILITY 
The aircraft industry has long focused their effort during design on the combat 
survivability of the platform due to the high asset cost. Aircraft combat survivability is 
defined as the capability of an aircraft to avoid or withstand a man-made hostile 
environment1 (Ball 2003). Adapted to the ground platform domain, the same definition 
applies and survivability is directly dependent on the ability of the platform to avoid and 
withstand the threat—thus, the concepts of susceptibility and vulnerability. The inability 
of a platform to avoid all the threat elements that make up the hostile mission 
environment is referred to as the susceptibility of the platform, while vulnerability of the 
platform is referred to the inability of the platform to withstand the man-made hostile 
environment (Ball 2003). These definitions are also aligned to the Department of 
Defense’s definition of survivability which refers to all aspects of protecting personnel, 
weapons and systems. The four basic principles of protection philosophy revolving 
around 1) not being detected, 2) not being hit, 3) not being penetrated, and 4) to survive 
when penetrated (Vivek and Roopchand 2012). Susceptibility accounts for the kill chain 
before a hit, while vulnerability focuses on preventing penetration and ensuring 
survivability after threat impact. To improve survivability, it is vital to reduce both 
susceptibility and vulnerability (Ball 2003). 
1. Susceptibility Reduction 
Susceptibility reduction technologies are applied during the first two phases of the 
protection philosophy to minimize emitted signature and prevent target acquisition by the 
enemy. 
a. Signature Management 
When a platform is in operation, the presence is inevitably projected through 
emitted visual, thermal, infrared (IR), and radar signatures. Delicate signature 
management allows the defender to avoid detection and thus engagement (Vivek and 
Roopchand 2012; Vass 2003). Hence, signature minimization should be considered 
1 The definitions are adapted in order to draw reference to platform design in general. 
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during platform design and modifications. Table 1 highlights the various types of emitted 
signatures during operations, their potential sources, and viable signature reduction 
technologies.    
Table 1.   Signature Types and Management. 
Types of 
Signature 
Potential Source Signature Reduction Design/ 
Technologies 
Visual - Shape and size 
- Color 
- Texture and Shadow 
- Reduced dimensions 






- Hot engine 
 
- Screening to diminish heat signature 
- Creating thermal signature compatible 
to environment 
- Change in geometry 
- Insulation or thermo barrier coating 
- Use of less emissive materials 
Radar - Reflections of 
electromagnetic (EM) waves 
that vary with target material 
properties  
- Measure by Radar Cross 
Section (RCS) 
- Suppression of radar signature 
- Microwave camouflage 
- Shaping of platform (e.g., reducing 
sharp edges) 
- Use of radar-absorbing material 
 
 
b. Sensor Capability 
Alternatively, if the platform can engage the enemy prior to being detected, 
survivability is ensured when predicated by target neutralization. Hence, the ability to 
detect, classify, and identify the enemy plays an important role in this first-strike 
advantage. Following the principle of “see first, shoot first,” swift closure of target 
engagement procedures through the equipping of advanced sensor suites reduces 
susceptibility, directly improving platform survivability. 
2. Vulnerability Reduction 
The fundamental concept behind armor design is the dispersion of the penetrator’s 
energy so as to minimize the threat effectiveness. The most widely used approach is up-
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armoring. Adding more armor protects against the incoming threat by reducing the 
probability of perforation.  
a. Passive Armor 
Passive armor is traditionally made of metal as metal’s structural properties of 
high strength, reasonable ductility, and good toughness allow it to be easily worked on to 
develop into armor packages. Armored steel is the most widely used material for armor 
development. The efficiency of the armor is fundamentally determined by preventing 
perforation, followed by the amount of penetration by the incoming threat before it is 
stopped. A universal measure for armor is the rolled homogenous armor (RHA). RHA is 
used as the reference datum against which armor performance is benchmarked; the higher 
the equivalence to the RHA thickness, the better the armor is in stopping a threat. 
Ceramics have been used in recent times in an attempt to reduce weight, while passive 
protection modules may also contain a hybrid of metal and ceramic. With identification 
of the threat kill mechanism, vulnerability reduction technologies can be appropriately 
inserted in order to minimize the damage effects. 
Another design strategy of increasing passive armor protection is through hull 
shaping. The design strategy through hull shaping is evident in the design of the Mine 
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. The V-shaped hull design deflects the 
blast effects of an underbelly threat. The high ground clearance between the hull and the 
threat further diminishes the blast effects, reducing the vulnerabilities against underbelly 
threats. 
b. Reactive Amor 
Kempinski and Murphy highlight that the aim of reactive armor is to disrupt the 
effectiveness of the penetrator by breaking up the threat, be it a long-rod KE penetrator, 
or the metal jet from a CE threat. The design of reactive armor entails a material, often 
explosive, sandwiched between two plates. The front and rear plates are known as flyer 
plates and reactive armor placement is often sloped along the platform exterior in order to 
improve its effectiveness. When the penetrator jet penetrates the carrier plate, the high 
energy ignites the explosive. The explosion disrupts the process of penetrator jet 
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formation. The detonation also causes both plates to accelerate diagonally outwards and 
disperse the jet, further interrupting its smooth formation and thus diminishing its 
effective lethality. The disruption to the jet formation greatly reduces the vulnerability of 
the platform (Kempinski and Murphy 2012). Figure 4 depicts this process. 
 
 Mechanics of Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) (from Kempinski Figure 4. 
and Murphy 2012). 
As reactive armor is currently a non-reusable technology, the armor module is not 
capable of defeating multiple threats targeting the same impact point. Hence, reactive 
armor is often designed into small modules to minimize the vulnerability against multiple 
attacks. The explosive layer will also need to be carefully selected to ensure that the 
explosives are inert to small arms fire, yet when activated, can create the necessary 
explosive effects to deny threat penetration into the base armor of the platform. 
c. Active Protection System 
The concept behind an active protection system (APS) is to prevent the incoming 
threat from impacting the target defense. Prevention of threat impact is achieved by 
disrupting the incoming threat from target acquisition through soft-kill mechanism, or to 
track, engage, and neutralize the threat itself through hard-kill measures (Vivek and 
Roopchand 2012). The APS technology creates an invisible armor layer around the 
ground system. When an incoming threat targets the ground system, APS mechanisms are 
activated to defeat the incoming threat, preventing penetration of this additional armor 
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layer. In this thesis, APS is classified as a vulnerability reduction technology as the APS 
defeat mechanisms create and prevent penetration of the APS armor layer.  
Soft-kill measures are utilized to disrupt, confuse, and divert any incoming 
sensor-based weapon system from correctly engaging the target. The incoming threat 
commonly acquires a target using laser, radar, and seeker to detect for electromagnetic 
and radar signatures reflected or emitted by the target. Hence, countermeasures aim to 
reproduce these signatures to decoy and disrupt the laser and seeker from successfully 
acquiring the target. For instance, to prevent heat-seeking missiles from accurately 
identifying the target, infrared decoy flares are expended to mask the thermal signature 
emitted from the defensive platform. 
In hard-kill systems, Gresham (Gresham 2011) explains that the APS intercepts 
and destroys the incoming projectiles before it hits. Sensors and radar suites, when 
coupled with a launching system to fire interceptors, can detect, track, and engage the 
incoming threats. When a threat is detected and classified, the active protection system 
will first monitor the threat trajectory to validate its threat potential. Once confirmed as a 
valid threat, the interception distance and flight path are calculated and threat interception 
is initiated. Upon threat neutralization, any residual fragments are handled by the 
platform’s armor.  
As threats become more complex and penetrative, passive armor is no longer 
physically feasible to provide all-round protection. A traditional RPG-7V can penetrate 
upwards of 500 mm of RHA. Thus, better armor technology is being introduced, from the 
originally purely metallic passive armor, to the use of lighter material armor, reactive 
armor, and APS.  
G. MOBILITY 
The ability to move across different terrain provides the vehicle with the 
flexibility to adapt to different mission requirements. Running gear and drivetrain 
upgrades are common technologies employed to improve mobility. A mobility study by 
Sher, Refael and Luria (1988) shows that platforms designed with good off-terrain 
mobility are more survivable. Better mobility enables diversion of the route of 
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advancement towards the mission objective, directly expanding the required defense 
frontage and reducing the probability of engagements and ambushes. Under engagement, 
the ability to maneuver through different terrain also allows the vehicle to better evade 
the threat. 
Nevertheless, to achieve high mobility, vehicle platforms are commonly designed 
to be lightweight with limitations on allowable payload. The lower carrying capacity has 
an adverse impact on the amount of armor that could be carried as add-on armor. Up-
armoring of a platform improves crew survivability (Grujicic, Arakere, and Bell 2009). 
Notwithstanding the protection offered by extra armor, this impacts the vehicle’s weight 
and degrades its mobility. Hence, instead of vulnerability reduction, a high-mobility 
platform leverages its movement to avoid threats and enhance its survivability through 
susceptibility reduction. 
H. PLATFORM DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
In an area defense operation, while the urban terrain provides a tactical edge to 
the defense, the combat advantage is still the underlying determinant for mission success. 
The executing defensive platforms must be designed to complement the operation type in 
order to enhance the probability of achieving area defense objectives. Sometimes, one 
factor in the triangle dominates the equation and is more significant than other design 
criteria in meeting operational needs. Constrained by engineering limitations, it is thus 
imperative to determine significant operational requirements and focus the design efforts 
that impact these operational requirements to improve overall system capability. 
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III. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH 
The application of a systems engineering process with a life cycle perspective 
provides a systematic approach to identifying significant design considerations for a 
ground system that impact the achievement of mission objectives during an area defense 
operation. The systems engineering approach applied for this thesis is shown in Figure 5. 
It is based on the waterfall model, initially introduced by Royce for software 
development (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011), and modified for this research. 
 
 Systems Engineering Waterfall Model (showing the chapter Figure 5. 
reference within the thesis). 
The application of systems engineering approach begins with an appropriate 
definition of the problem within the implied system boundaries and constraints of an area 
defense in an urban terrain in Section B of this chapter. Through analysis of major 
stakeholders’ requirements in Section C, the purpose of the system can be determined. 
The concept of area defense operation is depicted in Section D of this chapter. Arising 
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from the concept of operations, Section E outlines critical functions that the land forces 
conducting area defense have to perform in order to achieve the desired outcomes. Clear 
MOEs are essential to determine the key desired objectives of an area defense and 
provide definite criteria to benchmark varying effects arising from different alternatives. 
Section F of this chapter highlights the three MOEs that are important to the area defense 
mission objectives. The use of modeling and simulation, described in detail in Chapter 
IV, allows analysis and identification of significant platform design factors that are 
influential in the overall mission success of an area defense operation. The simulation 
results are then analyzed in Chapter V to determine the effects of the respective factors 
and provide insights for the design of ground systems to achieve the objectives of an area 
defense operation.  
A. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
The problem description phase identifies the capability gap to be filled within the 
specified boundaries of influence and system constraints. System boundaries scope the 
design influence of the ground system, and segregate influences from external systems. 
The system context diagram in Figure 6 illustrates the interactions and flow energy, 
materials, and information across identified boundaries between the land forces 
performing area defense and the external environment.  
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 System Context Diagram of Ground Systems Conducting Area Figure 6. 
Defense. 
The ground forces performing area defense fundamentally interact with four other 
external systems during operation. As the area defense is performed in an urban 
environment, the system has to adapt to the environmental conditions imposed by the 
geography. The urban clutter boosts cover and concealment, while concurrently limiting 
the line-of-sight ability and performance of communications within the terrain. The 
environment influences the combat tactics and resulting effectiveness.  
The second external system is the higher operational command. The area defense 
is executed in accordance with the strategic intent of the higher command. The higher 
command decides the defense objective and plans defense deployment. The tactics are 
translated to mission commands and tasking orders. To maintain updated situational 
awareness, situation reports are constantly uploaded from the ground forces.  
The enemy force plays an important role in the conduct of the area defense. Both 
forces engage in cross-fire to accomplish their respective missions. Counter-mobility 
obstacles can be pre-deployed to limit the enemy movement within the area of operations. 
During engagement, stray fire may inflict unintended collateral damage on the local 
population and infrastructure.  
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Through identifying the interactions across boundaries, the ground forces 
conducting area defense shall focus on multiplying terrain advantages, meeting the higher 
command’s objectives, and gaining combat edge over the enemy’s threat—all while 
minimizing impact on the local population. The main determinant lies in the setup and 
design of the ground forces of the area defense. Relating to platform design, the main 
constraint is the overall system weight and allowable payload that can be carried. While 
improving protection to enhance survivability has been a foundational approach in the 
past, the efficacy of this design approach may be seriously hindered due to the change in 
battleground conditions and enemy threats. 
1. Problem Statement 
Traditional platform up-armoring to reduce vulnerability does not have the 
capability to resolve and adapt to the fast changing threat conditions in an urban 
environment. The inability to withstand incoming threats leads to a higher casualty rate 
during operations. Constrained by physical design limitations, platform design must adapt 
to the multi-dimensional threats to achieve area defensive mission success with minimum 
losses. This adaptation can be achieved by designing the ground system to incorporate 
significant factors that complement mission success through the study of several 
vulnerability and susceptibility reduction platform improvements. 
B. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
The main stakeholders in the performance of an area defense operation are the 
higher command and the ground forces. The higher command focuses on the strategic 
deployment of an area defense and defines the overall success criteria for the operation. 
Hence, the purpose of the area defense has to meet the effective need of the higher 
command. To achieve the mission objective, the ground systems must be survivable 
against incoming threats to effectively neutralize enemy forces within the defense area. 
This need is translated to the design objectives for the ground systems. The roles and 
effective needs of the respective stakeholders are summarized in Table 2.   
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Table 2.   Stakeholder Analysis. 
Stakeholder Roles Effective Need 
Higher 
command 
With a holistic overview of the 
overall battlefield situations, the 
higher command defines the 
mission objective and plans 
strategic deployment of the area 
defense 
- To achieve successful defense 
of the objective against enemy 
hostilities 
- To achieve minimum casualty 
losses 
- To deploy area defense 
appropriately to counter the 
enemy’s assault 
Ground troops  The ground troops execute the 
area defense operation, 
neutralizing the enemy’s assault 
while remaining survivable 
against the enemy’s onslaught 
- To defend the objective and 
repel the enemy’s assault 
- To effectively engage and 
destroy invading enemies 
- To survive against enemy 
attacking fire  
Local 
Population 
The local population resides in 
the area of operations. 
- Normalcy to be restored 
within the area of operations 
 
C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
Ground systems are deployed in strategic defensive positions within an area 
defense. Established outposts at the front line swiftly detect an incoming assault and 
perform prioritized engagement of lethal threats. Constrained by urban infrastructure and 
terrain features, enemy forces are obstructed and forced to maneuver along defined axes 
during the attack. Concealed in good cover, the defensive platforms can effectively 
engage channeled enemy forces within these killing areas. A well-established 
communications network improves situational awareness, facilitates coordinated attack, 
and enhances the overall defensive efficiency of the area defense. Figure 7 depicts the 
operational concept of an area defense. A detailed description of the scenario, to include 
friendly and enemy forces, is provided in Chapter IV. 
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 OV-1: Operational Concept of Area Defense. Figure 7. 
D. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Figure 8 shows the functional hierarchy for a ground force conducting an area 
defense operation. The functional hierarchy is developed in close relation to the concept 
of operation of an area defense. In this analysis, area defense is defined as a static defense 
force aim to deny enemy access into the urban environment. While counter-attacking 
may be executed during area defense, the execution of the counter-attack is not 
considered within the scope of this thesis. 
There are six main functions identified for an area defense operation. These 
functions are closely referenced to the applicable components of the urban operational 
framework and underline the tasks that were performed during defensive operations. The 
decomposition of each function is illustrated in the subsequent figures. 
Observation outpost at 
elevated positions 
Layered defense engaged 
canalized enemy 
Reliable communications due to 
well-established network 
Enemy canalized 
onto main axes 
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 Area Defense Functional Hierarchy. Figure 8. 
1. Maintain Situational Awareness 
To maintain an information edge over the enemy, the friendly forces conducting 
the defense must constantly maintain situational awareness of the battleground conditions 
(FUN.1). Sensors can be deployed in advanced positions to detect and identify enemies 
(FUN.1.1), allowing the defense to perform tactical adaptations to counter opposing 
attacks. The friendly forces in defense also monitor changes in the external urban 
environment (FUN.1.2). Terrain changes due to damaged urban structures or weather 
conditions will affect mission tactics and outcomes. Similarly, it is always of the utmost 
importance to monitor own-force health status (Fun.1.3) through situation reports to 
determine the force level as this has a direct impact on mission success. The functional 
hierarchy of maintain situational awareness is illustrated in Figure 9. 
 
 Functional Hierarchy of Maintain Situational Awareness (FUN.1). Figure 9. 
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2. Communicate 
The ability to communicate effectively (FUN.2) is an important function to relay 
information along the chain of command and across the forces. Information plays a vital 
role in military operations and the ability to expeditiously transmit (FUN.2.1), receive 
(FUN.2.2), and process (FUN.2.3) battlefield data directly translate to combat 
advantages. When information of an enemy force is gathered, the information is 
transmitted to other friendly units and higher command. The higher command interprets 
and processes the received information and adjusts the defense tactical formation. Ground 
troops can be repositioned to prepare for anticipated engagement of incoming enemy. 
 
 Functional Hierarchy of Communicate (FUN.2). Figure 10. 
3. Maneuver Forces 
The shaping of ground deployment forms an important pillar in the framework of 
urban operations. The defensive units require good mobility to maneuver (FUN.3) swiftly 
within the operational theatre to execute deployment strategy. The functions of navigate 
(FUN.3.1) and move (FUN.3.2) enable the ground forces to take up designated defense 
positions. The area defense can also transit into a mobile defense operation. Swift 
navigation and movement of ground troops will enhance the operational effectiveness of 
the mobile defense. 
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 Functional Hierarchy of Maneuver Forces (FUN.3). Figure 11. 
4. Limit Enemy Advance 
Counter-mobility tactics are often employed to great effect in urban terrain. The 
urban terrain offers infrastructure that limits the routes of advance by the hostile 
adversaries. To manipulate enemy’s movements effectively, decoys can be deployed 
(FUN.4.1) to attract the enemy to move to a desired location, while deployment of 
obstacles (FUN.4.2) serves to hinder movement. Both strategies aim to divert the enemy 
away from their desired attacking route and channeled them into designated kill zones to 
inflict maximum casualties. 
 
 Functional Hierarchy of Limit Enemy Advance (FUN.4). Figure 12. 
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5. Destroy Enemy 
One of the most common military operational objectives is to destroy the enemy. 
In area defense operations, the ground forces need to engage and eliminate oncoming 
targets while maintaining the defensive formation. The function of destroy enemy 
(FUN.5) contributes to the lethality of the area defense. The sub-functions highlight the 
target engagement procedure. When a target is detected (FUN.5.1), the defending 
platform will proceed to classify the detection as an enemy, friendly or neutral 
(FUN.5.2). On confirmation of a hostile target, the platform will track (FUN.5.3) and 
engage (FUN.5.4) the target. The defense will also assess the inflicted damage and the 
status of own forces (FUN.5.5) during engagement. 
 
 Functional Hierarchy of Destroy Enemy (FUN.5). Figure 13. 
6. Hold Defensive Positions 
The area defense can serve as a fixed defense force to hold the fort against enemy 
assault. In the midst of target engagement, it is imperative to remain survivable against 
incoming threats from the enemy. The defending units can leverage susceptibility 
reduction systems or high mobility to seek cover against detection and engagement 
(FUN.6.1). The ground units can also intercept and destroy (FUN.6.2) any potential 
incoming threat by use of APS. Armor technologies can also be explored to improve 
survivability by reducing impacted threat effects (FUN.6.3) or preventing perforation by 
withstanding the damage caused (FUN.6.4).  
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 Functional Hierarchy of Hold Defensive Position (FUN.6). Figure 14. 
E. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS DEFINITION 
The MOEs are derived from stakeholders’ objectives and are vital criteria to 
measure the effectiveness of the deployed systems. As stated in Section C of this chapter, 
the two main stakeholders during an area defense operation are the higher command and 
the ground systems executing the defense. It is thus critical that the MOEs fulfill the 
effective needs of these stakeholders. Three main MOEs are identified. The first MOE is 
the probability of defending the intended objective (called the success rate of the area 
defense operation in this thesis). The other two MOEs, blue force attrition and loss 
exchange ratio (LER), will assist in the planning of the area defense deployment.  
1. Success Rate 
The fundamental consideration behind any military mission is the expected 
probability of success. The definition of success in each mission varies and is dependent 
on the battle conditions and the relative combat power between the attacker and defender. 
In this analysis, a mission success is defined as the attrition of 80 percent of the attacking 
enemy. Correspondingly, the loss of 80 percent of the defense will result in a failure to 
defend the objective. The success determinant is kept consistent across both forces and is 
used as the termination condition in the simulation. When an invading red force suffers 
high casualties, the high loss handicaps the ability to effectively attack and capture the 
objective; blue force has successfully defended the objective. Retrograde operations are 
expected to permit reorganization, resupply, and reinforcements for subsequent battles. 
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On the other hand, when an area defense suffers 80 percent casualties, it is unlikely that 
the heavily depleted force can persist with an effective defense. At this stage, the 
objective is considered to be overrun. It is of note that the criterion of 80 percent attrition 
is only specific for this analysis and can be modified for future work. 
2. Blue Force Attrition 
Blue force attrition defines the number of blue casualties suffered during battle. 
While a mission success translates to an overall attrition of less than 80%, it is always in 
the interest of any commander to minimize the expected friendly attrition even in a 
successful operation. In particular, this measure is vital to a commander’s decision on the 
need for reinforcements and the ability of the force to perform subsequent mission. This 
data is easily obtainable from the simulation during implementation. 
3. Loss Exchange Ratio 
The LER is the figure of merit during battlefield attrition. LER is computed by 
dividing the number of enemy killed by the number of friendlies lost. An LER of three 
signifies that for every three enemy killed, one defensive ground system is lost. An LER 
of one represents that the number of blue force and red force losses are equivalent. While 
the LER is strongly correlated to the number of systems deployed for the battle and 
derived from force attrition, the LER provides valuable insights to the higher command. 
It is critical for the higher command to have a projection of the probable battleground 
scenario in order to facilitate the command decision. Reviewing the ratio of casualties 
suffered against the amount of attrition inflicted directly signifies the effectiveness of the 
area defense. With prior intelligence of the invading force size, the higher command is 
able to deploy an appropriate area defense force. While the LER data is not readily 
available as a model output, the LER can be computed based on attrition data extracted 
from the model.  
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F. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS ANALYSIS 
Modeling and simulation is a suitable tool to allow for preliminary analysis of the 
identified problem of this thesis. An area defense model is constructed in MANA 
software to represent the battlefield engagements of an invading enemy attack on an area 
defense deployment. Through variation of numerous defined factors that influence 
susceptibility and vulnerability of ground systems, the generated results allow effective 
analysis of changing design factors on the aforementioned MOE and identification of 
significant design factors. 
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IV. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
A. MODEL SCENARIO 
In the following subsections the MANA model used for simulations in this 
research are discussed, including the scenario, force structure, and the concept of 
operations for the red and blue forces. The assumptions underlying this model are 
discussed in the next section. 
1. MANA-V Model 
Developed by the Operations Analysis group from Defense Technology Agency 
(DTA), New Zealand, MANA is suited for combat modeling of traditional operations 
with limited agent states in an urban environment (Ross 2012). Force units are modeled 
as agents in MANA. Agent attributes are assigned individually, allowing the agents to 
self-organize, interact, and act accordingly to achieve individual goals based on 
prevailing environment and situational awareness.   
A 15 kilometer by 8 kilometer area of operations is developed to depict an 
advancing attack on an urban terrain from the left, with the objective to overrun the area 
defense. The MANA model simulates a six-company assault on a two-company area 
defense. In this model, the attackers are defined as the red force, while the blue force 
represents the area defense. The battle front dictates the mission objective of the blue 
force, which is to set up an area defense to repel enemy from occupying this key urban 
terrain. The urban terrain separates the forces with the red forces on the left and blue 
forces on the right of the map. Distinct characteristics of the urban terrain and concept of 
operations are modeled for both the attack and defense (Figure 15). 
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 MANA Model Scenario. Figure 15. 
2. Force Structure 
Table 3 depicts the company force structure of both the blue force and red force. 
Each blue company comprises of a platoon each of M1A2 Abrams main battle tank 
(MBT), M2 Bradley armored fighting vehicles (AFV) equipped with tube-launched, 
optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles; and Stryker infantry fighting vehicles 
(IFV) with TOW missiles. Apart from the ground platforms, the organic troop squads 
from the Bradley and Stryker platoons participate in the defense as dismounts deployed 
as outposts. The red force company structure is of compatible capability; the blue force 
T-90 MBT platoon matches the M1 Abrams while a Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (BMP) 
IFV platoon is similar to the M2 Bradley AFV. The 50 caliber heavy machine gun 
technical platoon and mounted anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) technical platoon 
forms comparative adversaries for the Stryker platoon and the dismounted troop squads.  
Table 3.   Force Structure in MANA Model. 
Blue Force Company Red Force Company 
1 Platoon x 4 Abrams MBT 
1 Platoon x 3 Bradleys AFV 
1 Platoon x 3 Strykers IFV 
2 Squads x 2 troops with ATGM  
1 Platoon x 3 T-90 MBT 
1 Platoon x 3 BMP AFV 
1 Platoon x 3 technical 50 caliber vehicle 
1 Platoon x 3 technical ATGM vehicle 
2 Blue Companies (28 agents) against 6 Red Companies (72 agents) 
Attacking  
Red Force 









a. M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank 
The M1 Abrams is the main battle tank for the U.S. Army. The gas turbine 
engine-powered M1 Abrams is equipped with a 120 mm smooth bore cannon. Introduced 
into service since 1980, the M1 has an effective gun range of 4,000 meters and a top 
speed of 42 mph (Barr Group Aerospace 2014a). Capability modernization upgrades and 
the fitting of the Tank Urban Survival Kit (TUSK) have allowed the M1 Abrams to adapt 
to the operational conditions in an urban environment.  
b. Bradley Armored Fighting Vehicle with Tube-launched, Optically-
Tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) 2 Missile 
The Bradley armored fighting vehicle (AFV) is a tracked combat vehicle 
produced by BAE Systems Land & Armaments. Designed to operate with the M1 
Abrams tank, the Bradley AFV is equipped with a 25 mm cannon, has good cross-
country mobility, and is capable of amphibious operations (Barr Group Aerospace 
2014b). The on-board infantry section also allows for dismounted combat. The M2A1 
variant, used in this model, is mounted with a launcher system loaded with Raytheon 
TOW 2 missiles, capable of engaging armored and infrastructure targets at a range of 
3,750 meters (Army Recognition 2014).  
c. Stryker Infantry Fighting Vehicle with TOW Missile 
The Stryker family of infantry fighting vehicles was developed by General 
Dynamics Land Systems and was first delivered to the U.S. Army in 2002 (Barr Group 
Aerospace 2014c). The Stryker vehicle is an eight-wheeled, medium-weight infantry 
fighting vehicle. There are many configurations within the troop-carrying vehicle family, 
ranging from the basic variant equipped with remote-controlled weapons station, to 
mortar carrier and ATGM variants (General Dynamics Land Systems 2010). Similar to 
the M2A1 Bradley AFV, the Stryker ATGM variant is equipped with the TOW 2 missile 
system. 
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d. JAVELIN Anti-Tank Guided Weapon 
JAVELIN is a man-portable, shoulder-fired, medium-range missile system 
supplied by Raytheon and Lockheed Martin Javelin joint venture. Commonly operated by 
a two-person team, the compact and lightweight JAVELIN can also be fired as a one-man 
operation for engagement of armored ground systems (Strickland 2008). Equipped with 
an automatic self-guidance system to acquire potential targets, the fire-and-forget 
characteristics allow the operator to conceal their own location on firing. The versatility 
of two attack modes (top-attack or direct path) further improves its lethality within the 
effective range of 2,500 m, while the extended-range JAVELIN missile can engage 
targets up to 4,750 m (Lockheed Martin Corporation 2013). 
e. T-90 Main Battle Tank 
The T-90 tank is the latest T-series MBT to be fielded by Russia. The T-90 is 
equipped with a dual-axis stabilized 125 mm smoothbore cannon, capable of firing 
normal rounds as well as anti-tank guided missiles up to an effective range of 4,000 m 
(Military-today 2014, Army-technology 2014). Designed with “Kontakt-5” ERA, the T-
90 is equipped with an additional layer of protection on top of its hull passive armor. 
Powered by an 840-horsepower piston engine, the T-90 has great cross-country mobility. 
f. Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty Infantry Fighting Vehicle 
The Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (BMP) is a Russian tracked infantry fighting 
vehicle. The second generation BMP-2 has a significant lethality upgrade and is equipped 
with a two-man turret with a stabilized, dual-fed 30 mm cannon and a co-axial 7.62 
machine gun. The infantry-carrying BMP-2 has applique steel armor, but its lack of 
inherent ERA like the T-90 makes it vulnerable against most anti-tank munitions 
(TankNutDave 2014).  
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g. Technical 50 Caliber and Anti-Tank Guided Weapon Vehicle 
The technical vehicle is an improvised vehicle modified to provide an offensive 
capability. Characterized by its high mobility, technical vehicles are often equipped with 
heavy machine guns or ATGM missile systems to inflict heavy damage on ground 
systems and troops. 
3. Blue Force Concept of Operations 
Defense deployment strategy is volatile and highly dependent on environmental 
and threat conditions at the time of battle. In this model, the deployed defense is based on 
the subjective interpretation of the urban terrain, concept of operations of area defense, 
and strategies and urban operational framework in the field manual.  
 






Layered Defense at 
strategic positions 
Concealment Advantage 
- Personnel at 95% 
- Platform at 60% 
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a. Pre-deployed Outpost and Defense Advantage from Buildings 
In confrontational land battle, MBTs represent the highest threat due to their 
lethality and high protection. Hence, trooper squads with ATGMs are deployed at 
outposts to look out for advancing enemy with MBTs as prioritized targets. As the 
outposts are pre-deployed, pre-dumped ammunition is possible at each outpost. Coupling 
high cover and concealment provided by the infrastructure with the elevated advantage of 
target engagement by troop squads hiding in buildings, the troop squads are allocated 
with a 95 percent concealment advantage in the model. 
b. Strategic Layered Defense 
The MBT is the most lethal and survivable asset in the blue force area defense. 
Hence, the area defense shape is layered with the strongest M1 Abrams MBTs as the 
front line against advancing armored platforms, supported by M2 Bradley AFVs and 
Stryker IFVs in subsequent layers. The last line of defense consists of an M1 Abrams 
platoon minus and a troop squad, aiming to eliminate any advancing red force that has 
penetrated through the area defense. In MANA modeling, the amount of concealment of 
an agent is defined by an allocated percentage from 0 to 100. A high allocated 
concealment percentage translates to a lower detection probability by the enemy. As the 
ground vehicles are pre-deployed in strategic defense positions along the minor axes in 
this model, all defensive platforms are allocated with 60 percent concealment. Pre-
deployment along the minor axes allows the defense to monitor the major axes within the 
urban terrain while simultaneously patrolling the minor axes to prevent flanked attack. 
c. Established Inter-squad Communications 
Urban terrain causes impedance to radio communications. A well-planned area 
defense, however, can deploy base stations and relays on tall buildings in advance to 
bolster communication network performance and overcome transmission and reception 
problems (Edwards 2002). Hence, the defense is modeled to have reliable intra- and 
inter-squad communications.  
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4. Red Force Concept of Operations 
The red force attacks the urban objective from the left to the right of the map in 
Figure 17. Due to low cover and surrounding open terrain, there is limited advantage to 
travel cross-country to attack the urban objective from the top or bottom while subjected 
to reduced mobility during maneuver. Hence, the advancing enemy moves along the three 
main axes with the aim to maneuver into the urban terrain within the shortest possible 
time to seek cover. The presence of the water body further limits the route of 
advancement. On entering the urban battleground, the red force will diversify their forces 
to utilize all mobility avenues to attack the area. The spreading of forces also allows the 
red force to sweep through the urban area and destroy all encountered defensive units. 
 
 Red Force Concept of Attack. Figure 17. 
a. Urban “Canyons” Movement 
The MANA model subjects the attackers to disadvantageous conditions of 
fighting in an urban terrain. The presence of infrastructure highlights one distinct 
Spreading of Force 
along axes in 
general direction 
Limited by urban 
“canyons” to 
maneuver along axes 




characteristic of urban terrain: urban “canyons.” In urban warfare, red force platforms are 
involuntarily channeled to maneuver on axes between buildings. The natural terrain 
compartmentalizes, disperses, and dissipates the combat effectiveness of the attack. The 
urban terrain subjects the advancing force to ambushes from elevated and pre-positioned 
defenses. 
b. Misalignment of Red Force Attack 
A well-coordinated attack allows the invaders to perform a swift attack and with 
improved killing efficiency during the battle. The presence of infrastructure, however, 
obstructs line-of-sight communication, disorganizes assault routes, and reduces the 
overall effectiveness during the attack. In the model, the advancing force will attack in 
the general direction in accordance to the set waypoints. 
c. Limited Inter-squad Communications 
Interference caused by buildings and structures disrupts electronic 
communication. Fading and path loss during communications prevents effective relay of 
information among the attackers. Without an established communications network, the 
red forces are limited to only intra-squad communications in the model. 
B. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
During battle, troops exhibit different behaviors when encountering various 
battleground conditions. While MANA allows manipulation of individual agent under 
different conditions, the following assumptions aim to standardize the exhibited behavior 
across the agents within the same force. 
a. All Platforms Will Travel at Half Speed When Being Engaged 
Under engagement, platforms will reorganize into defense positions and scan for 
the threat source. Upon identification, the engaged troops will attempt counter fire to 
eliminate the threat. To perform reorganization and target acquisition, the platform is 
expected to slow down, and all agents are modeled to travel at half speed when being 
engaged. 
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b. There Are No Land Mines Employed During Area Defense 
Due to the nature of the urban battleground, the use of land mines may cause 
collateral damage to the local population. As the blue force does not exhibit insurgency 
behavior, land mines are not considered for this model. 
c. Area Defense to Remain in Defense Position When Engaged 
The defensive troops are deployed in layered defense positions as part of the 
overall tactics. Despite engagement by the enemy, defensive units will remain in 
concealed positions to reduce susceptibility. Hence, concealment allocation percentage 
remains constant even when the blue force is under fire from the enemy.  
d. Concealment Drops when Defense Fires at Target 
To engage the advancing enemy effectively, blue force agents need to emerge 
from their defensive cover during battle to detect, classify, and intercept the target. 
Engagement of targets gives away their own positions, increasing the probability of being 
detected and engaged. This behavior is modeled by a decrease in concealment factor 
whenever the defense engages an enemy. Considering that the troop squad is deployed 
within the building, the infrastructure still provides substantial concealment, resulting in a 
smaller decrease in concealment factor. Concealment of dismounted troops and platforms 
are modeled to drop from 95 to 50 percent and from 60 to 20 percent, respectively, during 
enemy engagement, as summarized in Table 4. 
e. Attack is Modeled as a Two-Wave Assault 
Six red force companies advance towards the objective via three separate routes. 
Due to expected road width limitation, it is unlikely that two companies of platforms can 
practically travel abreast at the same time. Hence, the second company along each route 
is set to initiate movement after a delay of 250 time steps. The staggered movement 
serves to simulate convoy movement. In this formation, the attacker also reduces the 
effects of potential ambush on the entire force. 
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f. Attacker to Move Towards Enemy When Engaged 
The objective of the attack is to capture the objective through annihilation of the 
defense. Hence, when a red force agent is being engaged, the red force will execute 
tactical movement to avoid further engagement. The tactical movement is represented by 
an improvement to 20 percent of allocated concealment factor. Upon detection of the 
threat source, it will advance towards the blue force and perform engagement.  
Table 4.   Allocated Concealment Percentage for Respective Agent 
States. 






Default state 95% 60% 0% 
When engaging target 50% 20% 0% 
When engaged by threat 95% 60% 20% 
 
C. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT 
1. Model Factors Variation 
Agent attributes are assigned based on open source market research, equipment 
online technical specifications, previous studies (Treml 2013), and the intended variations 
of the identified factors. There are many attributes pertaining to the area defense model. 
As it is impossible to test all the factors, careful selection of the model factors is 
important to identify factors that may have a significant impact on the identified MOEs. 
Table 5 highlights an initial list of main factors applicable for the respective categories of 
survivability, mobility, lethality, sensor capability, and tactics.  
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Table 5.   Initial List of Considered Factors. 





Inherent armor Affects vulnerability FUN.6.4 
Withstand incoming 
threat 
APS equipping Affects vulnerability FUN.6.2 
Intercept incoming 
threat 
ERA equipping Affects vulnerability FUN.6.3 
Mitigate incoming threat 
effects 
Concealment Affects susceptibility 
and vulnerability 
FUN.6.1 
















Affects susceptibility FUN.1.1 
Deploy sensors 
Mobility Speed Affects susceptibility FUN.3.2  
Move assets 
Lethality Weapons range Affects lethality FUN.5.4 
Engage target 





Affects the overall 
effectiveness of area 
defense 
FUN.0 
Execute Are Defense.  
Factor affects more than 
one function. 
 
Each factor contributes to the performance of at least one sub-function identified 
in Section E of Chapter III during the execution of the area defense. As this thesis intends 
to investigate the relative contribution of mobility, protection, and sensor capability, the 
factors of speed, inherent armor, and sensor classification range are selected. The selected 
factor corresponds to the functions of withstanding incoming threat, classifying target, or 
moving of assets during area defense operation. The selected factors are also observed to 
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relate closely to the iron triangle for vehicle platform design. Each factor is further 
promulgated into the three platform types of M1 Abrams MBT, M2 Bradley AFV and 
Stryker IFV, resulting in a total of nine variables. The equipping of APS, related to the 
function of intercepting incoming threat, is also selected in order to study the effects of 
introducing a pro-active defense system. The equipping of APS, however, will only be 
applied to the M1 Abrams asset, allowing for a focused study on how survivability 
improvement on the main fighting asset contributes to the MOEs.  
These factors of M1 Abrams MBT, M2 Bradley AFV, and Stryker ICV were  
varied across a range in relation to the baseline model values and were only applicable to 
ground vehicle systems. On the other hand, these variations were not applicable for the 
dismounted blue force agents as the focus of the study is for the determination of 
platform design factors. Battle tactics and defense formation were also not considered as 
they are highly subjective, dependent on battle conditions and commander’s preference. 
Tactics variation results in aggregated effects arising from different parameters and hence 
individual effect from the respective factor may not be easily interpretable. Table 6 gives 
the details. 
Table 6.   Model Inputs for Variation. 






M1 Abrams: 1,000mm 
M2 Bradley: 500mm 
Stryker: 250mm 
All platforms: 70% to 130% 




Not equipped. Number 
of hits to kill M1 
Abrams = 1 
Equipped or not:  
Number of hits to kill the M1 
Abrams agent increases from 






M1 Abrams: 4,000m 
M2 Bradley: 3,500m 
Stryker: 2,000m 
All platforms: 100% to 200% 
of baseline model platform 
classification range 
Mobility Speed M1 Abrams: 25mph 
M2 Bradley: 25mph 
Stryker: 36mph 
All platforms: 70% to 130% 
of baseline model platform 
speed 
 42 
a. Inherent Armor 
In MANA model, the armor thickness of each agent is a model input. Each 
modeled platform is built with different armor thickness. This input is varied between 
±30 percent of its baseline model armor. This variation not only allows for investigation 
of the effect of vulnerability reduction, it also allows the model to be used to study the 
effects of armor degradation on the overall area defense MOEs. 
b. APS Equipping on M1 Abrams 
In the baseline model, the criterion for loss is based on a single perforated hit for 
all agents. When a platform is equipped with an active protection system, it can intercept 
incoming threats to prevent penetration. APS equipping reduces the probability of hits 
and increases survivability during engagement. The equipping of APS on the M1 Abrams 
is modeled by increasing the number of hits to kill an M1 Abrams MBT from single hit to 
three hits. This modeling representation is chosen instead of reducing the probability of 
hit of an enemy’s weapon so as to limit the APS improvements to M1 Abrams MANA 
agent only. 
c. Sensor Classification Range 
In the model, there are two main sensor characteristics that are determined: sensor 
detection and sensor classification. Sensor detection inputs define the detection range and 
the rate of detection at specific ranges. Sensor classification inputs define the range at 
which the platform can identify the detected target as a friendly, neutral, or enemy, and 
the probability that the platform can accurately perform threat identification. In the 
baseline model, sensor classification ranges were set to approximately 50 to 65 percent of 
their respective sensor detection ranges. This model input was varied from the current 





The speed of the platform determines the probability of engagement between both 
allegiances. When a vehicle is moving at high speed, it possesses reduced susceptibility, 
as well as lower lethality as it is harder to aim at and engage a target. The model inputs 
the top speed of the platform within the terrain and each platform type maneuvers with 
different mobility. Hence, the variation is performed on each platform within the range of 
70 to 130 percent of its baseline model speed. By investigating both mobility 
improvement and degradation, it provides insights on how trade-off within the iron 
triangle can optimize the objectives. 
2. Relationship between Model Inputs and Area Defense Operation  
The effects of the selected factors are spread across different sub-functions as 
highlighted in the functional analysis of an area defense operation. The speed of the 
ground systems affects the function of moving assets (FUN.3.1). Performed by the 
running gear (e.g., sprockets, tracks, and wheels, etc.) and drivetrain, upgrades can be 
implemented to improve the overall mobility of the ground systems. The ability to 
classify the target (FUN.5.3) indirectly contributes to the lethality improvement and 
susceptibility reduction during engagement. With a longer classification range, the 
defense will be able to engage the target early, resulting in a higher probability of 
destroying the enemy while reducing the probability of being engaged.  
Variation of inherent armor thickness directly affects the ground system’s ability 
to withstand incoming threats (FUN.6.4). When a ground system is equipped with better 
and thicker armor due to improved armor technologies, it is more survivable against 
incoming threats. APS equipping on the M1 Abrams will allow the MBT to reduce 
susceptibility by intercepting the incoming threats (FUN.6.2). The mapping of the factors 
to the functions is illustrated in Table 7. 
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Table 7.   Mapping of Model Inputs to Functions and Physical 
Applicability. 











- Improvement of 


























- Increasing hull armor 
thickness 
- Use of advanced 
materials to improve 
armor performance 











APS Active protection system 
equipping  
 
3. Two-Factorial Design of Experiment 
A design of experiment (DOE) allows an experimenter to be efficient for fitting a 
model and determine how one or multiple factors affect the response variable (Bourgeois 
et al. 2013), or in this thesis the effect on an MOE. A common approach is the use of 
factorial DOE. A factorial experiment revolves around an experimental design where the 
factors consist of discrete states. The DOE examines the resulting outcomes due to 
different combinations of factor states and determines both the effects of each factor and 
the effect due to interactions among the factors on the response variables. An initial 
design sets each factor in a factorial design to only two states with the aim to identify 
significant factors for a more detailed analysis subsequently. For example, in a two-factor 
design experiment, the full factorial design between the states consists of 2 x 2 = 4 (i.e., 
22) combinations. For this thesis, a total of ten factors will result in 1,024 combinations. 
Although a fractional factorial design may be done to omit possible combinations, it is 
still unable to reduce the number of required runs to be within a manageable time margin 
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for this study. Hence, factorial design is not a suitable DOE in this case and a more 
efficient method is required. 
4. Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube DOE 
An alternative approach is the use of a space-filling design. A good space-filling 
design samples points across the experimenter space with minimal unsampled regions. 
The use of orthogonal Latin hypercube with variations (Ye 1998) has been deeply 
explored and the methodology (Cioppa and Lucas 2007) of nearly orthogonal Latin 
hypercube (NOLH) allows the experimenter to achieve a well-sampled design matrix 
efficiently with a relatively low correlation between the columns. Of the ten variables, 
nine are variables across a range of discrete possible values, while the equipping of APS 
is a two-state factor. A catalogue of ready-to-use computational Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet tools (Sanchez 2011) is available to determine the values for the respective 
factor in each design point. Using the NOLH methodology, a minimum of 33 design 
points is required. Through the use of JMP statistical analysis software, a multivariate 
analysis can be performed to determine the correlation between the factors. According to 
Cioppa and Lucas (2007), a correlation factor of approximately ±0.03 would be 
appropriate.  
By using 33 design points, the correlation value between the ten factors derived 
from a multivariate analysis by JMP software is -0.256. To reduce the correlation, a 
larger number of 65 design points, originally meant for design with 12 to 17 factors, is 
used. The larger sample provides a much better space filling across the design space and 
reduces the correlation by more than 30% to -0.1796. Figure 18 shows the correlation 
between the factors. While it may seem that the derived correlation of -0.1796 is still 
relatively high, a closer review at the correlation matrix, however, shows that the 
correlation between the factors is acceptable.  
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 Correlation for Ten-factors Design for 33 (above) and 65 (below) Figure 18. 
Design Points. 
Figure 19 shows the correlation matrix between all the ten factors. It is observed 
that all the correlated designed points are well spread within each of its respective design 
space. This represents a well-sampled design of experiment. The only exception lies in 
the factor of APS. The sampled design points falls along two lines within the region.  
Approximate reduction of 30% 
from -0.256 to -0.1796 
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 Correlation Matrix between All Factors. Figure 19. 
The relatively higher correlation is mainly due to the presence of this two-state 
factor in APS equipping. The two-state factor limits the design points to be constrained 
across two planes, thus reducing the spread of the space filling and results in a high 
correlation value. A partial view of the correlation matrix is exploded in Figure 20. On 
investigation of the partial correlation matrix, it can be observed that each level within 
APS equipping is actually well represented in the design space by the 65 sampled design 
points.  
Design points 






along two lines 
in relation to 
APS equipping 
factor 
Exploded view in Figure 20  
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 Partial Correlation Matrix between Four out of Ten Factors.  Figure 20. 
An assessment is performed by omitting the two-state factor of APS from the 
multivariate analysis and the correlation between the remaining nine factors drops 
significantly to -0.0364, close to the criterion of ±0.03. This resulting correlation shows 
that the design points selected for the remaining nine factors are indeed well-spread 
within their respective design range, further reinforcing the observation that the 65 
chosen design points represent a well sampled ten-factor design space. Although the 
eventual correlation is -0.1796, it is mainly due to the presence of a two-state factor in 
APS equipping, and not because of a poorly sampled design matrix. Hence, the use of 
NOLH methodology with 65 combinations of design points is an appropriate DOE for the 
scope of this thesis. For each design point, 50 replications are simulated, resulting in a 
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V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
JMP statistical analysis software is used for the analysis of compiled simulation 
results. The JMP software allows for regression model analysis on the effects of the 
varied factors on the MOEs response output of success rate, blue force attrition, and LER.   
A. SUCCESS RATE 
A mission success is recorded based on the attrition of 80 percent of the opposing 
force in the MANA model. Illustrated in Figure 21, the blue force has a mean success rate 
of 74.7 percent. The R2 value is the coefficient of determination and denotes the 
proportion of response variable’s variability that is explained by the derived regression 
model. R2 value ranges from 0 to 1. The higher the R2 value, the higher is the amount of 
variability explained by the regression model. An R2 value of 0.828 for the mean success 
rate model shows that the model explains more than 82 percent of the variability in the 
response outcome of success rate.  
 
 Regression Model for Mean Success Rate. Figure 21. 
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1. Ten-Factor Main Effects Analysis on Success Rate 
Analyzing the significant factors influencing the success rate of the area defense, 
two main significant factors stand out; both are related to the M1 Abrams MBT asset. 
The amount of MBT passive armor has the largest positive effect on the success rate, 
while the equipping of APS runs a close second. In comparison, the other eight factors 
are relatively insignificant. Increasing the survivability of the strongest defensive 
platform will translate to a stronger defense and eventually better combative power—
hence the increase in success rate. With both factors showing a much larger significance 
in the model over the other eight factors, a two-factor analysis is performed to focus on 
the influence of these two factors. 
 
 Ten-Factor Effects Analysis on Success Rate. Figure 22. 
2. Two-Factor Main Effects Analysis on Success Rate 
In JMP software, the highest order of the regression model can be set with the aim 
to develop a model that explains most of the variability of the model. The two-factor 
analysis with set order of two investigates the linear and quadratic effects of MBT armor, 
as well as the bilinear interaction of MBT armor and APS equipping. An adjusted R2 
value of 0.947 indicates that the two-factor analysis explains close to 95 percent of the 
variability in the model. The higher adjusted R2 value relative to the R2 value for the ten-
factor model also implies that the interaction between M1 Abrams passive armor and 
APS equipping is a significant factor while the absence of a quadratic term highlights that 
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a linear model is adequate. When both the passive armor thickness of the M1 Abrams 
MBT and APS equipping show a positive effect on the success rate, it is expected that the 
interaction should also result in a positive effect. The reverse is observed, however. 
While this negative effect is possible, a closer review of the mathematical formulation 
provides an adequate explanation for this unexpected effect. 
  
 Effects Analysis of MBT Armor and APS Equipping on Success Figure 23. 
Rate. 
Arising from the regression model, the mathematical equation to compute mean 
success rate based on the two factors of MBT armor and APS equipping is derived as 
follows: 
 
Mission Success Rate = -0.679698 + 0.0012067*(MBT Armor) + 0.3959506*(APS) – 
0.001183*(MBT Armor-1000.12)*(APS-0.50769) 
 
The mathematical variation of MBT armor ranges from 700 to 1300, while the 
two-state of APS equipping takes on the value of “0” and “1.” The effect of the 
interaction term is dependent on the combination between the values between MBT 
armor and the equipping of APS. A combination of low armor and APS equipping or 
high armor with no APS equipping will result in a positive effect due to the interaction 
term. The equipping of APS, however, also activates the APS term and the approximate 
40 percent increase in the overall computed success rate more than offset the any possible 
negative impact due to the interaction term. For example, when the MBT armor takes on 
a value of 1,000 mm, the overall success rate for APS equipping and no APS equipping is 
0.923 and 0.527, respectively. Hence, complementing M1 Abrams existing armor with 
APS still increases the overall success rate of the area defense despite the negative 
interaction effect. 
 53 
An analysis of the interaction between MBT armor and APS equipping is 
illustrated in Figure 24. Parallel graphs signify there is no interaction effect between the 
two factors; significantly non-parallel graphs indicate an interaction between the two 
factors. As the two graphs are observably not parallel, there is an effect between the 
interactions of the two factors, with the effect determined by the gradient difference 
between the two graphs. Although the regression model derives a model equation that 
mathematically allows for more than 100 percent success rate, there is little significance 
of success rate beyond the theoretical upper limit of 100 percent.  
 
 Effects of APS Equipping on Success Rate Conditioned on 700 mm Figure 24. 
and 1,300 mm of Passive Armor. 
The two graphs plot the mean success rate against APS equipping conditioned on 
the lowest and highest passive armor of 700 mm and 1,300 mm, respectively. There are 
two main insights that are observed from the interaction plots. Firstly, complementing 
MBT with APS will increase the success rate for all values of MBT passive armor 
equivalence. The amount of effect due to the combination of the MBT armor and APS 
equipping is explained by the parallelism between the two graphs. Secondly, the 
equipping of APS has a significantly larger effect on low passive armor conditions than 
when the M1 Abrams MBT is equipped with thick armor. When an MBT is equipped 
with armor technologies that are vastly superior to the lethality of the attacking force, the 








provided by the APS has negligible impact, represented by the almost flat graph. On the 
other hand, without the added protection of the APS, low-armor platforms are highly 
vulnerable to attacks from a lethal enemy, resulting in a low success rate of less than 10 
percent. APS provides a significant protection advantage that translates to better system 
survivability. The equipping of APS greatly improves the survivability of the low-armor 
platforms in area defense, reflected by the manifold increase to more than 70 percent.  
Figure 25 shows the effect of up-armoring on platforms. Generally, increasing 
passive armor protection will increase the success rate. Similarly, the up-armoring of 
platforms has a greater effect on success rate when the ground system has a lower 
baseline protection in the absence of APS. This observation reinforces previous two 
insights. More importantly, the results suggest that APS equipping can be used to 
substitute passive armor, albeit with diminishing effect. For example, to achieve an area 
defense success rate of 80 percent, two alternative platform configurations can be utilized 
to achieve this objective: a ground system with 800 mm of armor equivalent 
complemented by APS, or a passively protected system with a thicker armor of 1,150 mm 
of equivalent armor.  
 
 Effects of APS as a Substitute for Passive Armor. Figure 25. 
  
80% success rate 
can be achieved 
through two MBT 
configurations of 
passive armor and 
APS equipping 
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This insight facilitates better decision making during design tradeoff analysis. 
When the ground system does not allow for a passive armor design for 1,150 mm due to 
weight constraints, the same mission success rate can be achieved by a ground system 
with 800 mm of passive armor equivalent equipped by APS. The availability of alternate 
solution allows the decision maker to determine the overall armor requirements to 
achieve a desired success rate based on the conditional decision of APS equipping.  
B. BLUE FORCE ATTRITION 
Blue force attrition represents the number of MANA blue agents killed in each 
simulation. The R2 value of 0.948 for the model in Figure 26 indicates that the ten-factor 
model explains close to 95 percent of the variability in the number of blue losses in an 
engagement. The mean blue force attrition of 16.3 agents out of a force size of 28 reflects 
a 58 percent average casualty loss during battle. 
 
 Mean Blue Force Attrition and Regression Model. Figure 26. 
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1. Analysis of Ten-Factor Main Effects on Blue Force Attrition 
An analysis of the most significant factors yields a similar observation as the 
previous MOE. The amount of MBT armor has the largest negative effect on the blue 
force attrition. APS equipping remains the second-most influencing factor. The other 
eight-factors related to Bradleys and Strykers are not significant. Both MBT passive 
armor and APS directly improve the overall survivability of the M1 Abrams by reducing 
its vulnerability to incoming threats. The reduction in vulnerability directly translates to 
lower blue force attrition. Due to the large difference in effects between the two leading 
factors and the remaining factors, a two-factor analysis is performed. 
 
 10-Factor Effects Analysis on Blue Force Attrition. Figure 27. 
2. Analysis of Two-Factor Main Effects on Blue Force Attrition 
The two-factor analysis is shown in Figure 28. The regression model based on the 
significant factors of MBT armor and APS equipping improves the R2 and adjusted R2 
values to 0.972 and 0.970. There are four main factors that influence the model, with one 
being a quadratic term of the MBT armor. With an initial R2 value of 0.947 based on the 
ten-factor linear model, the slight improvement in variability explanation by the 
regression model suggests that the quadratic term does not have a large effect on blue 
force attrition in comparison to MBT armor or APS equipping. The quadratic term, 
however, serves to reiterate the importance of MBT armor on blue force attrition.  
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 Effects Analysis of MBT Armor and APS Equipping on Blue Force Figure 28. 
Attrition 
While there seems to be limited interacting effects between MBT armor and APS 
equipping due to their parallelism as shown in Figure 29, a closer investigation reveals 
otherwise. Numerically, with the lower survivability of M1 Abrams, the equipping of 
APS reduces the overall attrition by approximately four units. The reduction in attrition 
almost doubles to seven units when the M1 Abrams is equipped with better armor. This 
effect is even more significant when considering the overall attrition in both 
configurations. APS reduces the proportion of casualties by approximately 19 percent in 
low-armor configuration. With relatively strong armor, however, the decrease in overall 
casualty loss, coupled with the better attrition reduction, can reduce the overall proportion 
of casualties up to 66 percent. Therefore, the equipping of APS on well-protected 




 Effects of APS equipping on Blue Force Attrition.  Figure 29. 
C. LOSS EXCHANGE RATIO 
The LER is computed based on the ratio of the number of red force attrition and 
the number of blue force attrition. The higher the LER, the better is the area defense 
effectiveness of destroying the enemy and withstanding the invading attack. Unlike the 
analysis of blue force attrition, the numerical significance of the LER is of higher 
importance than the ratio of the values. In this MANA model, the definition of mission 
success is based on the attrition of 80 percent of the opposing force. In order for blue 
force to overcome the initial force disadvantage, the mean LER must be higher than the 











 Mean LER and Regression Model. Figure 30. 
With the higher mean LER of 3.97 shown in Figure 30 correlates to the higher 
than average mission success of close to 75 percent by the area defense. The higher mean 
LER than the initial force ratio indicates that blue force is gradually overcoming the 
numerical advantage by attriting the invading red force at a higher rate than its own 
friendly losses. The higher red force attrition rate causes the red force’s to sustain an 
attrition of 80 percent first, resulting in a mission success for the defense. The R2 value of 
0.934 indicates that 93 percent of the variability in LER can be explained by the 
regression model.  
1. Ten-Factor Main Effects Analysis on LER 
MBT armor is again the most significant factor with a margin over the equipping 
of the APS, while the other eight factors are less impactful. This result is consistent with 
the previous two MOE analyses. The improvement in survivability has a doubling effect 
on LER. With better survivability, blue force attrition will be reduced. At the same time, 
the availability of more surviving units to perform area defense increases red force 
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attrition. As the LER is computed as the ratio of red force attrition to blue force attrition, 
an increase in the numerator coupled with a decrease in the denominator results in a 
multiplier effect. A two-factor analysis will be similarly appropriate to investigate the 
effects of these two factors on the LER. 
 
 10-Factor Effects Analysis on LER. Figure 31. 
2. Two-Factor Main Effects Analysis on LER 
Blue force attrition forms the denominator for the computation of LER. Hence, 
LER exhibits similar behavior trending with blue force attrition. The two-factor analysis 
model in Figure 32 better explains the variability of the model with a higher adjusted R2 
value of 0.983 relative to the ten-factor model.  
 
 Effects Analysis of MBT Armor and APS Equipping on LER. Figure 32. 
By reviewing the interaction profile between the two factors, APS equipping has a 
larger complementary effect when the M1 Abrams MBTs are equipped with strong 
armor. The larger effect is observed by the steeper gradient of the graph representing 
1,300 mm passive armor in Figure 33.  
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 Effects of APS Equipping on LER Conditioned on 700 mm and  Figure 33. 
1,300 mm of Passive Armor. 
The lack of APS to supplement defensive units implies the requirement of a fairly 
survivable platform with strong armor of approximately 1,100 mm so as to overcome the 
numerical disadvantage. On the other hand, highly survivable units translate survivability 
advantage into combat lethality to achieve a high LER; thus, the area defense can 
withstand an attacking enemy with a smaller force. With advanced intelligence of an 
enemy force coupled with good understanding of the system capabilities of friendly units, 
higher command can allocate ground system resources more efficiently within the area 
defense to meet mission objectives.  
D. OPERATIONAL IMPACT ARISING FROM VULNERABILITY 
REDUCTION DESIGN 
The use of partitioning in JMP software allows for the creation of a partitioning 
tree hierarchy. This methodology produces an optimal split of the collected data with 
respect to a response outcome. The partition hierarchy categorizes the data and 
decomposes at critical values of specific individual input factors to provide another 
perspective for results interpretation.  
APS 
equipping 






The mean success rate of 74.7 percent is derived from 65 data points. If the M1 
Abrams MBT is equipped with strong armor of more than 1000 mm, which is simulated 
in 33 of the design points, the mean success rate increases to 94.7 percent. In contrast, 
based on the subset of 32 design points when the armor of the M1 Abrams MBT is less 
than 1000 mm, the mean success rate falls to 54.1 percent. This is illustrated in Figure 34. 
 
 First Level Decomposition of Partition Hierarchy. Figure 34. 
The next decomposition highlights the effects of APS equipping on the success 
rate based on conditional armor thickness of less than 1,000 mm. As the equipping of 
APS can only take on the value of “0” and “1,” a value of less than 1 indicates no APS 
equipping, while an APS value equal or more than 1 represents the equipping of APS. 
The 32 design points of low passive armor are evenly spread between these two APS 
equipping states. By complementing low armor with APS, the mean success rate 
increases to 80.1 percent, improving by 26 percent relative to a low armor condition 
regardless of APS equipping. 




increase to 94.7%  
When armor is 
less than 
1,000mm, mean 
success rate drops 
to 54.1%   
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 Partition Tree Hierarchy of Success Rate. Figure 35. 
The partition tree hierarchy provides valuable insight towards the relationship 
between platform design requirements and operational effectiveness and mission success 
rate. The presented value of 1,000 mm armor equivalence serves as a benchmark for 
armor design. By designing the ground system towards the specific passive armor 
protection, expected mission success rate can be inferred. Blue force attrition and LER 
data are similarly partitioned based on the factors of M1 Abrams armor and APS 
equipping. The partition hierarchy, however, is decomposed based on a critical MBT 
passive armor value of 1,075 mm instead of 1,000 mm, as shown in Figure 36. The 
different critical value provides another benchmark for armor design consideration.  
Conditioned with 








 Partition Tree Hierarchy of Blue Force Attrition and LER. Figure 36. 
Further analysis is performed based on the two presented critical values of 1,000 
mm and 1,075 mm of armor equivalence. Table 8 shows the effects of the various passive 
armor and APS configuration on the respective MOEs.  





Success Rate BF Attrition LER 
Mean  74.70% 16.32 3.97 
Below 1000mm No 28.13% 22.11 2.21 
Yes 80.13% 17.88 3.37 
Below 1075mm No 32.74% 21.88 2.28 
Yes 84.00% 16.89 3.65 
Above 1000mm No 89.13% 14.86 4.36 
Yes 99.88% 10.77 5.83 
Above 1075mm No 96.46% 13.52 4.76 
Yes 100.00% 10.10 6.15 
Blue – Higher than mean 
Red  – Lower than mean 
 
Although the analysis in consideration of both critical passive armor thickness  
values are based on the same set of design points, segregation in accordance to these two 
passive armor design points allows the higher command to understand the operational 
impact arising from choosing one passive armor baseline over the other. For example, 
Partitioned 
based on 
1,075mm   
Values are higher 
than overall mean   
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when not equipped with APS, up-armoring the M1 Abrams from 1,000 mm passive 
armor thickness to 1,075 mm equivalence and above will increase the mean success rate 
by approximately 7 percent.  
Two main effects are observed in this analysis. Firstly, regardless of APS 
equipping, a base M1 Abrams armor of more than 1,000 mm will provide better than 
average performance in all of the MOEs. Secondly, the equipping of APS has a 
significant effect, and more than doubling the mean success rate when the design of 
defensive units is more vulnerable to incoming threats. Thus, APS is an important design 
and operational consideration. During design development, this insight allows the higher 
command to weigh the implementation of APS during tradeoff analysis. 
E. SUMMARY OF MODEL RESULTS ANALYSIS 
While there is no threshold value for each specific MOE, this study allows the 
higher command to infer mission outcomes based on different ground system 
configuration on the expected mission success rate, blue force attrition, and defense 
effectiveness in terms of LER. The ground systems can also be operationally configured 
to achieve the intended effect of the MOE. Table 9 provides a summary of the analysis. 
The model results highlights survivability, and in particular vulnerability reduction, as the 
most significant factor in influencing the mission objective for an area defense within the 
iron triangle of ground system design.  
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Table 9.   Effects of Factors on MOE. 





MBT armor Significant Significant Significant 
Bradley armor Not significant Not significant Not significant Stryker armor 














Improvements in sensor classification range and mobility are found to not provide 
significant advantages during an urban area defense operation. The insignificance of the 
resulting effects may be attributed to the characteristics of the urban terrain. The 
obstructed line-of-sight by the urban structures limits the benefits of extended sensor 
range. Moreover, the dominance of close combat also prevents the full utilization of the 
sensor capability.  
The effect of enhanced mobility is hindered by the urban terrain setup which 
prevents swift maneuverability within the area of operations. The advantage of better 
mobility is also limited by the nature of area defense operations to deny access by enemy 
to key objectives. By operating as a fixing force, the ability to remain in defense positions 
and withstand attacks does not rely heavily on good mobility during execution. 
Two main significant factors contributing to the achievement of area defense 
operational objectives are vulnerability reduction measures of passive armor of the M1 
Abrams MBTs and the equipping of APS. Two critical values of 1,000 mm and 1,075 
mm of MBT passive armor are derived from partition analysis to provide design 
benchmark in relation to the MOEs. APS equipping is found to have a reinforcing effect 
in meeting the stakeholders’ effective need for high mission success rate, low blue force 
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attrition, and high LER. While the effect of APS varies across different MOEs, APS 
equipping is a viable substitute for passive armor. This finding provides the decision 
makers with an alternative during design tradeoffs in consideration of the overall 
survivability of the ground systems when constrained by engineering limitations on 
available payload for passive armor design. In view of engineering and weight 
limitations, it is thus imperative for ground system design to continue exploration of 
better and lighter passive armor technologies that would achieve the same passive armor 
protection with a lower weight requirement. Emerging armor technologies should focus 
on reducing vulnerability with minimal degradation to mobility and lethality of ground 
systems. Alternatively, APS may be a viable and complementary weight-saving substitute 
for passive armor during area defense operations. 
Table 10.   Summary of Analysis. 








Critical armor value 1,000mm 1,075mm 1,075mm 
Mean 74.70% 16.32 3.97 








for MBT armor 
Reduces BF 
attrition between 
19% to 66% 
Greatly increases 




VI. CONCLUSION  
A. SUMMARY 
The ability to achieve high mission success rates, low attrition, and high loss 
exchange ratios is important for the effectiveness of an area defense to withstand an 
attack in an urban terrain. The characteristics of urban terrain provide tactical advantages 
that are exploitable by the deployed defense. Ground systems must be designed to adapt 
and leverage these advantages. Constrained by engineering limitations in system design, 
there is a focused need to invest design effort on design factors that significantly impact 
area defense objectives.  
In this thesis, a study was performed to determine the impact of variation in 
ground system design factors on the overall operational effectiveness of an area defense 
in the area of mission success, friendly attrition, and loss exchange ratio during the 
engagement. The application of a systems engineering approach lays the foundation for a 
disciplined approach to explore the influencing factors of platform design considerations 
on these objectives.  
Through this study, survivability is found to be the most influential factor in 
contributing to the mission outcomes, while mobility and sensor classification ranges are 
found to have negligible effects. Passive armor protection of MBTs and the equipping of 
MBTs with APS emerge as the two most significant factors during an area defense 
operation. APS is also found to be a viable substitute for passive armor protection in 
survivability design. The reinforcing interaction between these two factors further 
improves the achievement of the operational goal and the study concludes with an 
analysis of the operational impact of various design combinations of passive armor and 
APS equipping. The findings in this thesis facilitate survivability design tradeoff 
decisions for ground systems in order to improve the desired operational effectiveness. 
With passive armor as the most significant factor in influencing the achievement of 
operational objectives, it is thus important to continue development of better and lighter 
armor technologies to reduce vulnerability and provide ground systems with the desired 
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survivability within the engineering limitations of ground systems design while 
maintaining lethality and mobility performances.  
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The current model builds on the execution of an area defense, one of three 
possible defense operation types. One identified area for future research is the expansion 
of the scope of study to the other two types of defense operations: mobile defense and 
retrograde missions. The scope expansion can be achieved through the modification of 
agents’ behaviors and responses when faced with changing battlefield conditions. 
Through the study of mobile defense and retrograde operations, the results will provide a 
holistic overview of the design optimization of ground systems to fulfill the operational 
requirements across the spectrum of defensive operations. 
Arising from the results of this study, development effort is encouraged to explore 
vulnerability reduction measures through passive armor or APS enhancement, instead of 
mobility or sensor classification improvement. This thesis, however, also recognizes that 
new technologies can impact other design factors not investigated in this study. Thus, 
future work can evaluate the impact of new design factors, for instance lethality or 
concealment improvement, on the survivability of ground systems during defense 
operations. 
Another area for future research may be the variation of tactics and task allocation 
effects on an area defense operation. In this thesis, force structures and battlefield 
formations are held consistent throughout the simulations. In operation, defenses are 
often task organized and deployed in anticipation of the advancing threats. Variation in 
force structure and deployment strategies will allow an insight into the application of 
doctrinal and tactical techniques and procedures during an area defense. 
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APPENDIX. SIMULATION RUN FACTORS INPUTS AND 
RESULTS 
 
 Design Points Combination for Simulation. Figure 37. 
MBT Bradley Stryker MBT Bradley Stryker MBT Bradley Stryker
1 1300 378 241 31 27 40 5875 7000 4219 0
2 1244 650 194 25 20 41 5250 6672 3594 0
3 1225 481 311 18 26 41 4125 4594 4922 0
4 1038 613 325 32 20 43 4250 5031 2734 0
5 1263 359 245 28 28 34 6250 3719 2813 0
6 1281 631 222 24 21 29 7500 3609 3828 0
7 1113 491 320 18 27 33 7625 6563 2500 0
8 1019 556 316 31 21 30 8000 5359 4844 0
9 1094 425 208 28 22 25 4750 5578 3984 1
10 1150 547 217 21 25 27 5500 6453 2969 1
11 1131 416 288 23 18 28 4625 4813 4063 1
12 1169 566 273 29 32 35 5625 4266 2891 1
13 1056 397 203 26 19 46 7125 4703 3203 1
14 1206 528 231 20 26 45 6875 4375 4453 1
15 1075 406 302 23 18 39 7000 6016 3359 1
16 1188 538 264 30 31 37 6625 6344 4375 1
17 1000 500 250 25 25 36 6000 5250 3750 1
18 700 622 259 19 23 32 6125 3500 3281 1
19 756 350 306 25 30 31 6750 3828 3906 1
20 775 519 189 32 24 31 7875 5906 2578 1
21 963 388 175 18 30 29 7750 5469 4766 1
22 738 641 255 22 22 38 5750 6781 4688 1
23 719 369 278 26 29 43 4500 6891 3672 1
24 888 509 180 33 23 39 4375 3938 5000 1
25 981 444 184 19 29 42 4000 5141 2656 1
26 906 575 292 22 28 47 7250 4922 3516 0
27 850 453 283 29 25 45 6500 4047 4531 0
28 869 584 213 27 32 44 7375 5688 3438 0
29 831 434 227 21 18 37 6375 6234 4609 0
30 944 603 297 24 31 26 4875 5797 4297 0
31 794 472 269 30 24 27 5125 6125 3047 0
32 925 594 198 27 33 33 5000 4484 4141 0
33 813 463 236 20 19 35 5375 4156 3125 0
34 756 481 203 27 28 35 8000 5906 3984 1
35 1300 388 231 20 29 32 7625 5031 4609 0
36 963 622 198 26 28 26 5250 6891 3438 0
37 1225 650 236 20 30 27 5750 3828 3047 1
38 719 491 208 28 24 37 4250 3938 4219 1
39 1263 444 217 21 20 44 4125 5359 4375 0
40 981 641 213 27 23 45 7500 3500 3203 0
41 1113 631 227 21 21 47 6125 6781 2969 1
42 850 416 255 22 18 29 6375 5578 2656 1
43 1094 434 278 25 19 33 7375 4156 2578 0
44 831 575 320 18 19 29 5500 5688 4141 0
45 1131 547 316 32 25 34 4875 4047 3906 1
46 794 406 259 19 32 42 5375 4484 2500 1
47 1056 463 306 26 32 41 5000 6234 2813 0
48 813 603 311 18 27 41 6875 4703 4766 0
49 1075 528 325 31 26 39 7250 6125 3828 1
50 1244 519 297 23 22 37 4000 4594 3516 0
51 700 613 269 30 21 40 4375 5469 2891 1
52 1038 378 302 24 22 46 6750 3609 4063 1
53 775 350 264 30 20 45 6250 6672 4453 0
54 1281 509 292 22 26 35 7750 6563 3281 0
55 738 556 283 29 30 28 7875 5141 3125 1
56 1019 359 288 23 27 27 4500 7000 4297 1
57 888 369 273 29 29 25 5875 3719 4531 0
58 1150 584 245 28 33 43 5625 4922 4844 0
59 906 566 222 25 31 39 4625 6344 4922 1
60 1169 425 180 32 31 43 6500 4813 3359 1
61 869 453 184 18 25 38 7125 6453 3594 0
62 1206 594 241 31 18 30 6625 6016 5000 0
63 944 538 194 24 18 31 7000 4266 4688 1
64 1188 397 189 33 23 31 5125 5797 2734 1






MobilityArmor Sensor Classification Range
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 Simulation Run Results. Figure 38. 






LER LER Std Dev
1 100% 11.32 3.05 5.46 1.32
2 100% 12.56 3.07 4.87 1.11
3 98% 13.02 3.91 4.87 1.53
4 62% 20.24 3.20 2.78 0.79
5 100% 11.62 3.42 5.46 1.68
6 100% 11.86 3.11 5.26 1.47
7 84% 18.78 3.83 3.17 0.95
8 50% 20.90 2.71 2.45 0.81
9 100% 11.00 2.47 5.54 1.24
10 100% 10.18 2.59 6.07 1.57
11 100% 10.42 2.80 5.99 1.70
12 100% 9.70 2.10 6.26 1.37
13 100% 12.16 3.28 5.13 1.41
14 100% 9.38 2.34 6.57 1.61
15 100% 11.28 2.45 5.40 1.25
16 100% 8.96 2.47 6.95 1.80
17 100% 13.56 3.25 4.55 1.16
18 74% 18.52 3.75 3.18 0.87
19 74% 18.56 3.98 3.20 1.03
20 74% 19.10 3.65 3.07 0.82
21 96% 15.14 3.97 4.09 1.15
22 68% 18.94 3.88 3.09 0.92
23 76% 18.98 3.47 3.07 0.78
24 88% 16.98 4.04 3.62 1.17
25 96% 14.24 3.95 4.39 1.32
26 24% 22.20 1.68 2.17 0.58
27 26% 22.04 1.91 2.20 0.59
28 26% 22.14 1.78 2.23 0.56
29 26% 22.08 1.96 2.30 0.56
30 30% 21.90 2.08 2.23 0.66
31 18% 22.62 0.97 2.04 0.48
32 36% 21.90 1.87 2.31 0.58
33 28% 22.48 0.95 2.12 0.50
34 76% 19.44 2.91 2.97 0.63
35 100% 11.66 2.89 5.32 1.52
36 56% 21.16 2.37 2.56 0.59
37 100% 8.76 2.25 7.04 1.73
38 80% 18.48 3.76 3.20 0.88
39 98% 11.32 3.29 5.52 1.55
40 34% 21.84 2.37 2.28 0.68
41 100% 10.20 2.48 6.01 1.40
42 70% 18.54 3.94 3.18 0.92
43 84% 19.50 3.01 3.00 0.66
44 30% 22.02 2.10 2.28 0.64
45 100% 10.50 2.85 5.95 1.70
46 72% 18.90 3.58 3.08 0.84
47 60% 20.84 2.68 2.64 0.66
48 24% 22.22 1.59 2.18 0.55
49 100% 11.24 3.30 5.64 1.74
50 100% 11.72 3.26 5.34 1.48
51 74% 18.88 3.38 3.06 0.82
52 100% 13.00 3.31 4.76 1.19
53 22% 22.48 1.34 2.05 0.55
54 100% 11.34 3.10 5.52 1.57
55 74% 19.08 3.47 3.04 0.77
56 98% 12.98 3.54 4.78 1.34
57 18% 22.50 1.43 2.04 0.54
58 92% 17.24 3.50 3.47 0.86
59 96% 16.74 3.22 3.59 0.81
60 100% 9.74 2.78 6.40 1.70
61 20% 22.24 2.05 2.14 0.62
62 98% 13.82 3.98 4.59 1.55
63 94% 15.62 4.25 4.02 1.35
64 100% 9.96 2.35 6.16 1.49
65 32% 21.86 2.37 2.27 0.70
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